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ABSTRACT 
Diagnosis of the transformation of executive governance in Europe must incorporate the 
diverse dynamics of EU-level agencies. This paper conceptualises theoretically and explores 
empirically multiple images of governance of EU-level agencies. Based on a rich body of 
survey (N=265) and interview (N=29) data among three regulatory and four non-regulatory 
EU level agencies, the paper demonstrates that EU-level agencies primarily combine the roles 
as autonomous administrative spaces and multilevel network administrations. Hence, EU-
level regulatory and non-regulatory agencies blend two models of governance. Moreover, the 
most important role observed among EU-level agencies is indeed as multilevel network 
administrations. Finally, this paper demonstrates that EU-level non-regulatory agencies score 
systematically higher on all governance dynamics compared to EU-level regulatory agencies. 
The role as a multilevel network administrator is thus more central to EU-level non-regulatory 
agencies, whereas the role as an autonomous administrative space is more paramount among 
the EU-level regulatory agencies.  
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INTRODUCTION  
This paper explores the transformation of executive governance in Europe by unpacking the 
diverse dynamics of EU-level agencies. Recent years have witnessed comprehensive reform 
efforts of the European Commission (Commission), partly to fill the institutional vacuum 
between the Community and the member-state level of government. One constituent 
ingredient thereof has been the institution of non-majoritarian European Union (EU)-level 
agencies with regulatory and non-regulatory discretionary competences beneath the 
Community institutions (Commission 2005). The ambitions of this paper are twofold: First, 
the paper conceptualises theoretically the diverse images of governance of EU-level agencies. 
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EU-level agencies are conceptualised (I) as autonomous administrative spaces with formal 
and factual independence vis-à-vis the Community institutions, and finally, (II) as EU-level 
Community institutions, serving as integral parts of the EU institutional apparatus, and (III) as 
multilevel network administrations that serve to integrate webs of domestic and EU-level 
agencies, ministries, interest organisations, research institutes, and external experts. These 
conceptual models are hereafter labelled Model I, Model II and Model III and they highlight 
overlapping, supplementary, co-existing and enduring governance dynamics among EU-level 
agencies. These dynamics are likely to co-exist, but the mix may change over time (Olsen 
2006). Secondly, these models are empirically illuminated by a rich body of survey data 
(N=265) and interview data (N=29) on civil servants in seven EU-level agencies. These data 
cover three regulatory agencies (EASA, CVPO, OHIM)
1
 and four non-regulatory agencies 
(OSHA, EUROFOUND, EEA and EMCDDA)
2
.
3
 The paper demonstrates how European 
integration happens by ‘stealth’ through the emerging mosaic of EU-level regulatory and non-
regulatory agencies (Majone 2005).  
 
Whereas agencification is an old phenomenon within European government systems 
(Wettenhall 2005), the ‘agency fever’ at the EU level is more recent (Kelemen 2002). We can 
distinguish between three waves of EU agency formation – the first in 1975
4
, the second from 
1990 to 1999
5
, and the third from 2001 to present (2006)
6
 (Szapiro 2005). According to the 
White Paper on Governance (2001: 24), EU-level agencies contribute to technical and sectoral 
know-how, increased visibility of policy sectors, administrative cost-savings, and 
strengthening of the abilities of the Commission to focus on core tasks. The creation of EU-
level agencies is also one way for the Commission to control the implementation of 
community regulation, to strengthen the capacities of the Commission to become political 
secretariats by hiving off technical tasks to semi-autonomous agencies, as well as securing 
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“expertise, credibility and visibility” (Commission 2005: 3). Still, there is a dearth of research 
on EU-level agencies in the EU governance literature. Studies of EU-level agencies is 
foremost centred on analysing agency establishment and reform (Geradin and Petit 2004; 
Groenleer 2006; Krapolh 2005; Kelemen 2002; Randall 2006; Thatcher and Stone Sweet 
2003; Vos 2000). At present, only some few studies offer primary data on the actual decision-
making dynamics unfolding within EU-level agencies (e.g. Egeberg 2006; Everson et al. 
1999). Diagnosis of the transformation of executive governance in Europe must embrace the 
diverse dynamics of EU-level agencies.  
 
EU-level agencies are depicted with multiple images in the literature and in official 
documentation. Whereas a recent Commission White Paper on EU regulatory agencies (2005) 
pleas for agency autonomy (Model I), the White Paper on Governance (2001) pleas for 
stronger Commission control on EU-level agencies (Model II). Finally, Egeberg (2006) 
pictures EU-level agencies as the hub in an emerging multilevel union administration that is 
characterised by administrative networks, fusion and engrenage (Model III). The vast 
majority of the agency literature is centred on domestic agencies in general and US federal 
agencies in particular (e.g. Christensen and Lægreid 2006; Pollitt et al. 2004; Thatcher and 
Stone Sweet 2003; Wilson 1989). Empirical studies of domestic agencies observe unintended 
consequences of establishing agencies (Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2003), reduced political 
control (Christensen and Lægreid 2006), increased agency autonomy vis-à-vis the Parliament 
and partisan politics (Shapiro 1997), and vis-à-vis the ministry level (Döhler 2003).  This 
paper demonstrates that EU-level agencies mainly combine two dynamics of governance by 
combining the roles as autonomous administrative spaces (Model I), and as multilevel 
network administrations (Model III). Hence, EU-level regulatory and non-regulatory agencies 
blend two models of governance. Agency dynamics are ultimately determined by how trade-
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offs between these models of governance are handled in day-to-day decision-making (Wilson 
1989: 327). Images of agency governance are assessed by considering two classes of proxies: 
organisational proxies and actor-level proxies. Organisational proxies include (i) the financial 
base of the agency, (ii) the composition of the management board, and (iii) the organisational 
specialisation of the agency. Actor-level proxies consist of (iv) the decision-making behaviour 
of the staff, (v) their individual role perceptions, and (vi) the identify conceptions of the 
incumbents. Hence, agency dynamics are measured partly by the organisational capacities of 
the agencies and partly by “exploring the beliefs and meanings through which [the officials] 
construct their world” (Bevir, Rhodes and Weller 2003: 4). 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: The next section unpacks the conceptual models introduced 
above and applies the organisational and actor-level proxies to this end. Next, the survey and 
interview data is presented. The empirical analysis is divided into to separate parts. Part one 
applies the organisational proxies to assess the diverse organisational images of EU-level 
agencies. Part two utilises the actor-level proxies to analyse actor-level images of EU-level 
agencies. Finally, the conclusion summarises the main empirical observations and compare 
these findings with key observations in the EU-level agency literature.   
 
IMAGES OF AGENCY GOVERNANCE: THREE CONCEPTUAL MODELS  
Theoretically, the agency literature is strongly informed by rational choice approaches 
generally and the principal agent perspective in particular, demonstrating how the formal 
design of agencies may reduce “agency losses” and subsequently “runaway bureaucracy” 
(Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast 1989; Curtin 2005; Geradin, Munoz and Petit 2005; 
Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2003). Other theoretical contributions to the agency literature have 
applied network theory (Eberlein and Grande 2005), institutional perspectives (Pollitt et al. 
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2004) as well as organisational theory (Egeberg 2006). EU-level agencies are unsettled 
administrative orders, constantly under scrutiny, reform and counter-reforms (Pollitt et al. 
2004: 246). Our endeavour is to unpack enduring governance dynamics that are likely to 
emerge among EU-level agencies. This section suggests the following three models or 
images: Model I: EU-level agencies as autonomous administrative spaces; Model II: EU-level 
agencies as Community institutions; and Model III: EU-level agencies as multilevel network 
administrations. 
 
Model I: EU-level agencies as autonomous administrative spaces 
As seen from the concept of the ‘European Regulatory State’, EU-level agencies may take on 
a life of their own by having de facto considerable leeway, substituting system unity with 
institutional diversity (Moran 2002; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 1998). “Most of the time, 
integration into a larger organized system competes with the desire for autonomy among the 
system’s components” (Olsen 2005: 4). Decentralisation of responsibility and authority to 
subordinated agencies is shown to involve a net loss of political control and a net gain of 
agency autonomy (Christensen and Lægreid 2006; Whitford 2002). The recent Commission 
White Paper on EU regulatory agencies (2005) pleas for augmenting agency autonomy. 
Having legal personality, EU-level agencies, notably the regulatory agencies, are seen as 
trustees with fairly broad mandates and guarantees of independence (Majone 2003). “[T]he 
Commission cannot give instructions to the agencies or oblige them to withdraw certain 
decisions” (Szapiro 2005: 4). “A European Administrative Space denotes that public 
administration operates and is managed on the basis of common European principles, rules 
and regulations uniformly enforced in the relevant territory” (Olsen 2003: 506). Legitimacy to 
EU-level agencies is conceived as reflecting the formal autonomy of the agencies vis-à-vis the 
Community institutions, and symbolised by their geographical distance from Brussels. 
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Debates on agency formation and agency localisation tend to trigger heated discussions 
among the member-states. The case of EASA is illustrative. The predecessor of EASA was 
the Joint Aviation Authority (JAA), an intergovernmental institution issuing 
recommendations to the member-states with regard to aviation safety. JAA was supplemented 
with a new Community institution with regulatory powers (EASA). It was also decided that 
EASA should be geographically relocated from Brussels to the current headquarter in 
Cologne. This decision caused clashes between member-states at the Laeken Summit in 
December 2001 (Kelemen 2002). Decisions to locate agencies at arms length distance from 
Brussels intend to symbolise agency autonomy and power vis-à-vis the Community 
institutions.  
 
“The consequence of creating agencies has been to populate the policy area with actors 
(agents) who have their own priorities, interpretations and influence” (Wilks and Bartle 2003: 
148). Thatcher (2005) reveals that domestic-level agencies maintain large amounts of 
autonomy vis-à-vis elected politicians. Similarly, studies of European Central Banks shows 
that institutional autonomy is safeguarded by a scientification of the institutions (Marcussen 
2005). Hence, an epistemic logic seems to strengthen institutional autonomy vis-à-vis partisan 
politics and politico-administrative steering. Finally, comparative studies on international 
executive institutions shows that subordinated agencies beneath intergovernmental 
organisations are likely to acquire large amounts of autonomy in day-to-day decision-making 
(Barnett and Finnemore 2004).  
 
Agency autonomy is likely to be cultivated if, (i) they are financially independent by having 
own financial revenues; (ii) if they have a management board dominated by own agency staff; 
(iii) if they have an organisational structure that is incompatible vis-à-vis the Community 
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bodies thereby strengthening organisational borders between the Community level and the 
agency level; and (iv, v, vi) if they are dominated by (1) departmental and/or (2) epistemic 
governance dynamics. (1) A departmental governance dynamic predict agency civil servants 
to be “neutral, intelligent, generalist professionals who advice ministers” (Richards and Smith 
2004: 779). Agency officials are thus expected to evoke classical Weberian civil servant 
virtues, being party-political neutral, attach identity towards their agency unit and division, 
and abide to administrative rules and proper procedures (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 167). 
This is the Westminster model that sees officials as neutral, permanent and loyal (Richards 
and Smith 2004: 783). (2) The epistemic governance dynamic predicts agency staff to enjoy a 
great deal of behavioural discretion and being influenced by external professional reference 
groups (Wilson 1989: 60). They are thus assumed to prepare dossiers, argue and negotiate on 
the basis of their professional competences and legitimate their authority on neutral 
competences (Haas 1992). Their decision-making behaviour is expected to be guided by 
considerations of scientific and professional correctness and the power of the better argument 
(Eriksen and Fossum 2000). This is the ‘Monnet official’ who is institutionally independent 
from any constituencies and a high-flying and mobile technocrat. 
 
Model II: EU-level agencies as Community institutions 
EU-level agencies may be pictured as integral components of a larger EU institutional system. 
Agency autonomy is thus sacrificed for the Union’s need for integrated and uniform 
administration (Olsen 2003). According to this model, the organisational borders between the 
Community institutions (notably the Commission) and the agency level are blurred, both to 
the observers and to the decision-makers themselves. According to Hofmann and Turk (2006: 
592), EU-level “[a]gencies integrate national and supranational actors into a unitary 
administrative structure…”. Similarly, Everson and Joerges (2006: 529) claims that 
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“European agencies are far from being independent instances…[They] remain firmly 
ensconced within the institutional umbrella of the Commission”. In organisational terms 
EUROSTAT and OLAF is formally integrated into the Commission services, while legally 
being separate agencies with their own director and management board. Most EU-level 
agencies, however, are vertically specialised outside the Community bodies. Still, these 
agencies are likely to lack factual autonomy if: (i) they are financially dependent on the 
Community, notably by the power of the European Parliament to dis/approve the annual 
agency budgets; (ii) if EU-level agencies have a management board dominated by community 
representatives, (iii) if they have a compatible organisational structures vis-à-vis the 
Community institutions – notably the Commission – that safeguard strong organisational links 
between the agency and Community bodies; and (iv, v, vi) if the agency staff is dominated by 
a supranational governance dynamic. A Supranational governance dynamic denotes that the 
agency staff has a “cosmopolitan” loyalty towards the whole Community, having a preference 
for “the common European good”, and acting on mandates and instructions issued by the 
Community politico-administrative leadership (cf. Table 1 beneath).  
 
The White Paper on Governance (2001) appealed for stronger Commission control of EU-
level agencies, while also underscoring the limited roles played by such agencies. However, 
the Commission also appeals to create a delicate balance between agency autonomy and 
Community control (Commission 2005: 6). During the discussion on the White Paper on 
Governance, the Commission seemed increasingly reluctant to grant autonomy to EU-level 
regulatory agencies by suggesting that the management board of such agencies should be 
equally represented by the Commission and the Council, and that the agency director should 
be appointed by the Commission (Almer and Rotkirch 2004: 59; Skjerven 2005: 56). The 
White Paper on Governance (2001) also underscores that agency staff are under the same staff 
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regulations as ordinary Community Administrators (Commission 2005: 20). Moreover, 
despite EU-level regulatory agencies are often seen as being more autonomous than non-
regulatory agencies, EU regulatory agencies are not “full regulators, but generally operate to 
assist the Commission in fulfilment of its functions” (Geradin, Munoz and Petit 2005: 71). 
They are only authorized to make individual decisions based on existing secondary 
legislation. EU-level regulatory agencies are thus an “instruments of centralization” of 
regulatory functions from the member-state level to the EU (Community) level. They are 
regulatory agencies without regulatory powers (Majone 2005: 97). 
 
Model III: EU-level agencies as multilevel network administrations 
Model III pictures EU-level agencies as the focal point in an emerging multilevel network 
administration that spans level of governance. Model III sees EU-level agencies as porous and 
transparent institutions, penetrated by webs of external actors and institutions. Agency 
governance is thus disaggregated at their institutional frontiers where seamless webs of actors 
that challenge agency autonomy (Model I) and Community coherence (Model II) (Rosenau 
1997; Slaughter 1998: 15). These networks create institutional links between the agency and 
external institutions, notably the Commission, industry, non-governmental organisations, 
universities and research institutions. Agency governance is ultimately about governing webs 
of formal and informal, stable and unstable, institutionalised and poorly institutionalised 
networks. “The result is to advance ‘experts and enthusiasts’” (Slaughter 2004: 9). The White 
Paper on Governance (2001: 17) argues that “…the Commission could develop more 
expansive partnership arrangements”. Similarly, Hofmann and Turk (2006: 87) argues that 
one of the main tasks of EU-level agencies is “the integration of national administrations into 
[the] operation [of EU-level agencies] to create a unitary form of administration in their 
respective field of operation”. Administrative networks of these kinds may serve the functions 
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of “information networks”, “planning networks” and “enforcement networks” (Hofmann and 
Turk 2006: 91). Similarly, Eberlein and Grande (2005) conceptualise regulation through EU-
level agencies as “transnational regulatory networks”. EU-level agencies network to achieve 
shared expectations and standards across levels of governance, and the EU-level agencies 
serve as the central node in these networks (Majone 2005: 101). 
 
The multilevel network model is likely to be fostered among EU-level agencies, if (i) the 
financial base of the agency is multifaceted, combining revenues from the Community, 
allowances from the member-states, income from the market, and own agency budgets; (ii) if 
the management board is dominated by external representatives, for example member-state 
representatives pursuing member-state preferences; (iii) if the organisational structure of the 
agency is multi-standard, combining multiple horizontal and vertical organisational principles 
that augment access for external actors and institutions. Agencies that are multiply organised 
have organisational capacities to incorporate multiple concerns, preferences, actors and 
institutions in day-to-day decision-making.
7
 Finally, (iv, v, vi) the multilevel network model 
is characterised by the presence of multiple and differentiated governance dynamics among 
the agency staff. The multilevel network model is likely to accommodate a balanced mix of 
supranational, departmental and epistemic governance dynamics among the agency staff.  
 
Table 1 summarises the proxies introduced above to assess the differentiated dynamics of EU-
level agencies.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
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The analysis presented below benefits from a rich body of survey and interview data on civil 
servants in seven EU-level agencies. These data offer observations on the actor-level proxies 
of Table 1: (iv) decision-making dynamics, (v) role perceptions, and (vi) identities and 
loyalties among the agency personnel. To systematically compare the multifaceted 
governance dynamics of EU-level regulatory and non-regulatory agencies, we carefully 
selected three regulatory agencies (EASA, CVPO, OHIM) and four non-regulatory agencies 
(OSHA, EUROFOUND, EEA and EMCDDA). The survey was conducted as a postal survey 
to all agency Administrators. The initial sample totalled 697 officials. The survey was 
conducted during 2005 and 2006 and resulted in a final sample of 265 respondents. After 
three rounds of reminders the final response rate totals 38 percent. This response rate is 
somewhat lower than similar surveys in the Commission (e.g. Hooghe 2005). Still, it suffices 
to illuminate core agency dynamics. However, conclusions are drawn with caution due to the 
moderate response rate and because only a selected sample of all 25 EU-level agencies are 
represented in the analysis. The final response rate is satisfactory in EASA, OSHA, CVPO 
and EUROFOUND, but unsatisfactory in EMCDDA and OHIM (see Table 2). The survey 
was supplemented by in-depth qualitative interviews in one regulatory agency (EASA: 12 
interviews) and in one non-regulatory agency (EEA: 17 interviews). These interviews were 
conducted during 2005 and 2006 on the basis of a semi-structured interview-guide. The next 
section is illustrated with direct quotations from transcribed interviews. Finally, to measure 
the organisational images of EU-level agencies the analysis is supplemented by descriptive 
data and statistics from all EU-level agencies with regard to (i)t he financial base, (ii) the 
composition of the management board, and (iii) the organisational specialisation of EU-level 
agencies. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
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THE EMERGING MOSAIC OF EU-LEVEL AGENCIES: EMPIRICAL 
OBSERVATIONS 
Part One: Organisational images of EU-level agencies  
This section applies the organisational proxies of Table 1 to assess the dynamics of EU-level 
agencies: (i) financial base, (ii) composition of the management board, and (iii) organisational 
specialisation of the agency. The Commission recently presented a comprehensive policy 
document on EU-level regulatory agencies (Commission 2005). According to this White 
Paper (p. 9), EU-level agencies should comply with the principles of openness, participation, 
accountability, effectiveness and coherence. Also, OECD reports have recently underscored 
agencification – that is, the vertical specialisation of government systems – as models of good 
governance, however balanced against other concerns such as accountability, transparency 
and efficiency (Christensen and Lægreid 2004). Yet, there is a dearth of research on whether 
EU-level agencies in practice adhere to these principles, as well as the factual governance 
dynamics unfolding within EU-level agencies. EU-level agencies cover multiple policy areas, 
have differentiated tasks, their organisational and legal status varies, as well as their staffing, 
linkages to external institutions, degree of institutionalisation, size and formal powers. They 
are “typified by their diversity” (Szapiro 2005:4). However, despite having varying 
administrative procedures, most of the present 25 EU-level agencies share some generic 
organisational features (Groenleer 2006): they are vertically specialised bodies outside the 
Community bodies, they have limited mandates and formal powers, they are directed by a 
director, headed by a management board with a majority of member-state representatives, and 
they are horizontally organised according to the principle of process, however, supplemented 
by the principles of area (two agencies) and purpose (four agencies). Most EU-level agencies 
thus have incompatible organisational structures vis-à-vis the Commission. Whereas the 
 15 
uppermost principle of specialisation of the Commission is purpose (sector), the uppermost 
principle of specialisation among the 25 EU-level agencies is process. According to proxy 
number three of Table 1, organisational incompatibilities across levels of government foster 
agency autonomy by creating organisational buffers towards the Commission (cf. Model I) 
(Trondal 2006). 
 
The combined organisational capacities of EU-level agencies may be assessed by considering 
their number and size. At present there are 25 EU-level agencies. These include 18 
Community agencies under the “first pillar”, three agencies under the “second pillar”, three 
agencies under the “third pillar”, and one executive agency (Source: 
http://europa.eu/agencies/index_en.htm). Finally, six agencies are under preparation. Six of 
these agencies are granted decision-making powers
8
, while the remaining agencies have tasks 
such as information, management, data gathering, executive, technical support and 
administration. However, the powers of EU-level agencies may not be assessed solely on the 
basis of their formal powers. Purely information gathering agencies, such as the EEA, may 
have regulatory implications at the Community level. EUROSTAT contributes, for example, 
to statistical integration and standardisation in Europe without having regulatory powers 
(Sverdrup 2006). In total, EU-level agencies have roughly 3100 statuary staff (mean: 137 
officials), and a total annual budget of approximately 530 mill € (budget: 23 mill €). The vast 
majority of EU-level agencies is financially dependent on Community revenues. According to 
the first organisational proxy of Table 1 (financial base), EU-level agencies serve the role as 
Community institutions (cf. Model II). Finally, the average size of the management board of 
EU-level agencies is 42 representatives, including an average of 29 member-state 
representatives, two Commission representatives, and 13 “other” representatives. “As the 
management board takes decisions by a two-third majority vote, Commission and EP 
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representatives are easily outvoted” by external (member-state) representatives (Kelemen 
2002: 201). One chief function of the board is to appoint the director of the agency. The 
composition of the management board (proxy number two of Table 1) is conducive to EU 
agencies resembling multilevel network administrations with a strong link to member-state 
governments (cf. Model III). Due to the strong member-state representation in the agency 
boards, the Commission has argued that “the boards fail to take sufficient account of the 
Community interest” (Majone 2005: 95).  
 
The sheer size of EU-level agencies varies tremendously. Whereas EMEA has an annual 
budget of 110 mill €, ISS has an yearly budget of 3,4 mill €. Moreover, whereas EUROPOL 
has approximately 500 officials, ENISA has only 8 civil servants. In some cases, the size of 
the management board even exceeds the number of agency staff. For example, whereas the 
number of member-state representatives at the OSHA board totals 80, the number of OSHA 
staff is 53 (Source: http://europa.eu/agencies/index_en.htm). Member-state representation at 
the agency boards is conducive to external penetration of the management of the agencies (cf. 
Model III). The next section demonstrates the actual decision-making dynamics that unfold 
within EU-level agencies.  
 
Part Two: Actor-level images of EU-level agencies 
The following analysis applies the actor-level proxies of Table 1 to assess the governance 
dynamics of EU-level agencies: (iv) decision-making dynamics, (v) role perceptions, and (vi) 
identities and loyalties among the agency personnel. First, Table 3 reveals the diverse contact 
patterns evoked by agency staff. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
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Table 3 reveals that regulatory and non-regulatory EU-level agencies activate fairly similar 
contact patterns among agency officials. Officials from both types of agencies put equal 
emphasis on epistemic and supranational contact patterns. Moreover, Table 3 also shows that 
officials in the non-regulatory agencies evoke stronger departmental contact patterns than 
officials in the regulatory agencies. The contact patterns shows the following rank order: 
Among the regulatory agencies: departmental contacts (mean=49 percent), epistemic contacts 
(mean=25 percent), and supranational contacts (mean=3 percent). Among the non-regulatory 
agencies: departmental contacts (mean=64 percent), epistemic contacts (mean=29 percent), 
and supranational contacts (mean=5 percent). Moreover, the departmental contact patterns 
reported above are more frequent intra-organisationally than inter-organisationally. This 
means that officials have more intensive contacts within their “own” unit and their “own” 
agency than across units and agencies. We also observe that officials in non-regulatory 
agencies have more regular contacts towards the director and programme manager level 
compared to officials in the regulatory agencies. Finally, epistemic contacts are primarily 
directed towards experts inside their own agency, and less frequently towards external 
experts. According to one official at EASA, “[o]ur system is technical. We make sure that 
aircrafts are safe, and there are not so much politics in that”. In sum, EU-level agencies can be 
characterised as autonomous administrative spaces (Model I) by combining departmental and 
epistemic contact patterns.  
 
Next, Table 4 reveals those considerations deemed most important among EU-level agency 
personnel.   
 
[Table 4 about here] 
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Table 4 confirms that officials in EU-level agencies perceive departmental and epistemic 
considerations as more important than supranational considerations. Secondly, Table 4 reveals 
that officials in non-regulatory agencies score higher on all three dynamics than officials in 
the regulatory agencies. The agency personnel rank-order their considerations as follows: 
Among the regulatory agencies: departmental considerations (mean=76 percent), epistemic 
considerations (mean=44 percent), and supranational considerations (mean=22 percent). 
Among the non-regulatory agencies: departmental considerations (mean=92 percent), 
epistemic considerations (mean=55 percent), and supranational considerations (mean=42 
percent). Table 4 reveals that the supranational considerations emphasised by officials in the 
non-regulatory agencies are primarily directed towards the Commission DGs. This may 
reflect the fact that whereas 22 percent of officials at the non-regulatory agencies have 
previous careers in the Commission, only 17 percent of officials in the regulatory agencies 
have prior Commission careers. Considering the epistemic considerations, Table 4 
demonstrates that importance is attached to in-house expertise, and that officials in the non-
regulatory agencies put far more emphasis on considerations from universities and research 
institutions than do officials from the regulatory agencies. In sum, whereas the administrative 
space model (Model I) fits better the regulatory agencies in this respect, the non-regulatory 
agencies are more in line with the network administration model (Model III) because multiple 
considerations are activated among the incumbents. 
 
Then, the respondents were presented a series of statements that they were invited to consider.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
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Table 5 reveals that the three governance dynamics are equally emphasised. The statements 
are rank-ordered as follows: In the regulatory agencies: epistemic statements (mean=63 
percent), departmental statements (mean=55 percent), and supranational statements (mean=51 
percent). In the non-regulatory agencies: epistemic statements (mean=66 percent), 
supranational statements (mean=61 percent), and departmental statements (mean=60 percent). 
Hence, Table 5 demonstrates that the network administration model (Model III) is supported. 
The epistemic dynamic is illustrated in the following quotations:  
 
According to one official at EASA, “EASA is rifted because the industry needs fast 
procedures and the agency needs more time” (Source: interview EASA). Furthermore, 
“[w]e have a set of requirements, and the manufactures have to show compliance to 
these requirements” (Source: interview EASA). “I have to make sure that the aircraft 
is safe, that is my task” (Source: interview EASA). One official at EEA claimed that 
“[m]y approach of working is academic, scientific” (Source: interview EEA). Another 
EEA official argued that, “I hold on to the idea of having an independent body at the 
European level for collecting environmental information, because working with the 
environment is something I really like, and I would like to stay with this for the rest of 
my life” (Source: interview EEA) 
 
Moreover, Table 5 reveals that the supranational dynamic is stronger among the non-
regulatory agencies than among the regulative agencies. Hence, a majority of the officials in 
the non-regulatory agencies tend to put forward proposals that they think is to the benefit for 
the EU member-states as a group and/or towards the EU. According to one EEA official, 
“[y]ou are working for the European Environment Agency, and DG Environment as well, and 
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you are supposed to support them. I see [DG Environment] a little bit as our superiors” 
(Source: interview EEA).  
 
According to one official at EASA, “I feel as I have very little autonomy” (Source: 
interview EASA). When confronted with the following question: “Do you feel that 
EASA is tightly linked to the Commission?”, one EASA official answered: “To be 
honest I do not feel that in the work that I do. I feel more that there is a Commission 
on the one side and EASA on the other” (Source: interview EASA). 
 
Finally, the departmental dynamic is illustrated by the fact that a large majority of the 
respondents strongly agree to the statements “My work is normally co-ordinated within my 
own unit”, and “I put forward proposals I think is to the benefit of my Agency”. The 
departmental dynamic is also revealed in the conflict patterns among the personnel. 
According to one official at EASA, “there seems to be some kind of competition between 
directorates…” (Source: interview EASA). In sum, Table 5 demonstrates that administrative 
autonomy (Model I) is surprisingly strong among the non-regulatory agencies compared to 
the regulatory agencies.  
 
Next, Table 6 reveals the multiple allegiances deemed important to officials in EU-level 
agencies.  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
Table 6 confirms that regulatory and non-regulatory agencies activate fairly similar patterns 
of actor-level allegiances. The allegiances evoked in Table 6 are rank-ordered as follows: 
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Among the regulatory agencies: departmental allegiances (mean=85 percent), supranational 
allegiances (mean=50 percent), and epistemic allegiances (mean=43 percent). Among the 
non-regulatory agencies: departmental allegiances (mean=92 percent), supranational 
allegiances (mean=67 percent), and epistemic allegiances (mean=44 percent). In sum, these 
observations are in accordance with the network administration model (Model III) due to the 
multiple allegiances evoked by the agency personnel. Furthermore, Table 6 also highlights 
that non-regulatory agencies score higher on all dynamics compared to the regulatory 
agencies. Moreover, the interviews shows that the loyalties evoked by agency officials are 
strongly departmental, directed towards own agency and unit.  
 
According to one EEA official, “[h]ere you have a very intense working program and 
from the very beginning you start to see yourself as a part of the unit”. Another EEA 
official claims that, “[f]or me the agency is part of my life”. Finally, one EEA official 
argued that, “I feel very loyal to my managing group. I also feel loyalty to my 
hierarchy, which is the program manager” (Source: interviews EEA). 
 
Actor-level supranationalism among officials in the non-regulatory agencies may partly 
reflect the fact that these officials have an average seniority of eight years in the agency, 
whereas officials in the regulatory agencies have an average seniority of only four years. 
Hence, officials in the non-regulatory agencies have been socialised for longer periods of time 
within the agency than officials in the regulatory agencies. As argued above, actor-level 
supranationalism in the non-regulatory agencies may also reflect pre-socialisation processes 
from their past careers within the Commission. Finally, Table 6 demonstrates that epistemic 
allegiances are primarily directed towards their own professional and educational background 
and towards the policy area in which they work. According to one EASA official, “we are a 
 22 
regulatory agency, and we are not just working for the airlines, we are working for public 
safety. Nobody likes to get an Airbus or a Boeing on its head” (Source: Interview). 
 
Finally, being embedded into multiple institutions, agency officials may have several 
representational roles to play. The respondents were asked to evaluate the roles played by 
other agency officials. Table 7 presents how agency officials perceive the representational 
roles played by other colleagues inside their “own” agency. 
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
Table 7 confirms that agency officials believe that other colleagues play three sets of 
representational roles. Officials in the regulatory agencies rank-order these roles as follows: 1) 
epistemic roles, 2) departmental roles, and 3) supranational roles. The respondents in the non-
regulatory agencies rank these roles as follows: 1) supranational and departmental roles, 2) 
epistemic roles. As observed above, Table 7 also reveals a stronger supranational dynamic 
among the non-regulatory agencies than among the regulatory agencies. Moreover, Table 7 
demonstrates stronger epistemic dynamics among the regulatory agencies compared to the 
non-regulatory agencies. In sum, Table 7 supports the multilevel network model (Model III) 
by the fact that agency personnel tend to view their colleagues as playing multiple 
representational roles. However, Table 7 also reveals that agency autonomy seems stronger 
among the regulatory agencies than among the non-regulative agencies, because (i) the 
epistemic dynamic is stronger in the regulatory agencies and (ii) the supranational dynamics is 
stronger among the non-regulatory agencies.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
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The Special Issue of Journal of European Public Policy in 1997 on EU-level agencies (Vol. 4, 
No. 2) contributed to a quantum leap in the study of EU-level agencies. Since then, however, 
only some few studies have offered primary data on the actual governance dynamics of EU-
level agencies. A burgeoning literature portrays EU-level agencies as network administrations 
that contribute to a subsequent europeanisation of domestic agencies (cf. Model III) 
(Dehousse 1997; Eberlein and Grande 2005; Egeberg 2006). For example, there are strong 
indications of autonomisation of networking agencies in the case of the Italian antitrust 
agency (Barberi 2006). Also the EEA is pictured as a networking agency (Schout 1999). The 
linking up of national agencies to the Commission in unitary states like Sweden (Statskontoret 
1997:21) and Denmark (Egeberg 2006) is also indicative of the strength of the multilevel 
network model. For example, Martens (2006) shows that national environmental agencies 
increasingly work directly towards the Commission. Martens (2006) also shows that national 
agency officials who participate in multilevel networks like IMPEL
9
 - that integrates national 
agencies, the Commission and EEA - tend to have large amounts of behavioural discretion at 
their disposal. Similarly, the Swedish Environmental Agency has intimate contacts with the 
European Environment Agency (EEA) (Statskontoret 1997:21: 44). Most of these contacts are 
poorly formalised inside the Swedish administration (Statskontoret 1997:21). The intimate 
participation of Swedish agencies towards the EU-level agencies is partly coerced and partly 
optional, accompanying perceptions among Swedish agencies of administrative competition 
from the various EU-level agencies (Statskontoret 1997:21: 50 Statskontoret 2003:29: 9). The 
development of network models of administrative governance is portrayed as the development 
of a ‘mega-administration’ (Wessels, Maurer and Mittag 2003: 441). 
 
Moreover, as showed in Tables 4 to 7, the supranational dynamic is also observable among 
EU-level agency officials. “…The Commission has played a key role in [the] establishment 
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[of EU-level agencies], and has often seemed reluctant to see its children grow up and become 
truly independent” (Jacobs 2005: 7). The following example is illustrative: “In the case of the 
Environment Agency [EEA], … the Commission expressed reservations regarding 18 of the 
93 project proposals in the agency’s first multi-annual work programme. These projects were 
subsequently excluded” (cf. Model II) (Groenleer 2006: 15).  
 
Finally, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) on 26 October 2005 revealed indications 
of administrative autonomy (cf. Model I). EFSA took an official stand on whether consumers 
should eat raw eggs and under-cooked poultry meat in the case of bird flu that contradicted 
the official Commission policy. Whereas the Commission spokesman argued that these 
products were safe, EFSA warned consumers against eating these products (EUobserver 
2005). Another indication of agency autonomy is revealed in the EEA. DG Environment has 
worried that the information gathering role of the EEA would grow into information analysis 
and eventually policy evaluation, thus becoming a true competitor to the DG (Jacobs 2005). 
According to one EEA official, “I think …[the Commission] don’t want an agency that 
provides analysis, just data” (Source: interview EEA). Hence, agency autonomy, even among 
the non-regulatory EU-level agencies, is noticeable (cf. Model I).   
 
This paper explores the transformation of executive governance in Europe by unpacking the 
diverse dynamics of EU-level agencies. The data reported above demonstrates that EU-level 
agencies indeed combine the roles as autonomous administrative spaces (Model I) and as 
multilevel network administrations (Model III). Moreover, the most important role played by 
EU-level agencies is as multilevel network administrations (Model III). Hence, EU-level 
regulatory and non-regulatory agencies blend two models or images of governance. Finally, 
the analysis demonstrates that EU-level non-regulatory agencies score systematically higher 
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on all governance dynamics compared to EU-level regulatory agencies. Hence, the role as a 
multilevel network administrator seems more central to the non-regulatory agencies, whereas 
the role as an autonomous administrative space is more paramount among the regulatory 
agencies.  
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NOTES 
                                                 
1
 The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the Community Plant Variety Office (CVPO), and the Office 
for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM).  
2
 The European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (OSHA), European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound), the European Environment Agency (EEA), and the European 
Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA).  
3
 According to the Commission White Paper on EU-level regulatory agencies (2005: 8), regulation refers to the 
“preparation and adoption of the regulatory framework, preparation and adoption of legislative acts for 
implementing the regulatory framework, monitoring implementation of the regulatory and legislative 
framework”. Non-regulatory agencies do not have formal decision-making responsibilities. Rather they offer 
services such as information gathering and analysis, certifications, risk assessments, executive functions, 
administrative and management, and technical support.   
4
 European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop - 1975) and Eurofound (1975) 
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5
 EEA (1990), European Training Foundation (EFT – 1990), EMCDDA (1993), European Medicines Agency 
(EMEA – 1993), OHIM (1993), OSHA (1994), CVPO (1994), European Police Office (EUROPOL – 1994), 
Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European Union (CdT – 1994), European Monitoring Centre on Racism 
and Xenophobia (EUMC – 1997), and European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR – 1999). 
6
 European Union Institute for Security Studies (ISS – 2001), European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC – 2002),  
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA – 2002), European Judicial Cooperation Unit (EUROJUST – 2002), 
European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA – 2003), EASA (2004), European Network and Information Security 
Agency (ENISA – 2004), European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders (FRONTEX - 2004), European Centre for Decease Prevention and Control (ECDC – 2005), European 
Defence Agency (EDA – 2005), European Research Agency (ERA – 2006). 
7
 For example, EUROSTAT is both vertically organised outside the Community institutions as a separate agency 
while at the same time being vertically integrated into the Commission services. 
8
 OHIM, CVPO, EAR, EASA, EDA and EUROPOL.  
9
  The European Union Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law. 
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Tables 
TABLE 1: THE THREE FACES OF EU-LEVEL AGENCIES 
 
Proxies: 
Model I Model II Model II 
(i) Financial base Own financial 
revenues 
The Community 
budget 
Combined finances 
from different sources 
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(ii) Composition of 
the Management 
board 
Dominated by own 
agency staff  
Dominated by 
representatives from 
the Community 
institutions 
Dominated by external 
representatives, for 
example member-state 
representatives 
(iii) Organisational 
specialisation across 
level of government 
Organisational 
incompatibility vis-
à-vis the 
Commission 
Organisational 
compatibility vis-à-
vis the Commission 
Multi-standard 
organisation 
(iv) Decision-making 
dynamics 
Departmental and 
epistemic 
Supranational Multiple: supranational, 
departmental and 
epistemic 
(v) Role perceptions 
among the staff 
Departmental and 
epistemic 
Supranational Multiple: supranational, 
departmental and 
epistemic 
(vi) Identities and 
loyalties among the 
staff 
Departmental and 
epistemic 
Supranational Multiple: supranational, 
departmental and 
epistemic 
 
 
TABLE 2: INITIAL AND FINAL SAMPLES AND RESPONSE RATE 
EU-level agencies: Initial samples Final samples Response rates 
EASA 130 65 50 % 
OSHA 31 20 65 % 
CVPO 17 15 88 % 
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EUROFOUND 86 50 58 % 
EMCDDA 78 24 31 % 
OHIM 355 91 26 % 
Total: 697 265 38 % 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 3: PERCENT OF AGENCY CIVIL SERVANTS WHO HAVE THE 
FOLLOWING CONTACTS AND MEETINGS DURING A TYPICAL WEEK 
(PERCENT).
*, 1)
   
 Regulatory 
agencies 
Non-regulatory 
agencies 
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Supranational contacts: 
- With “own” Commission DG 
- With other Commission DGs 
- With Commission expert committees 
- With the Council of Ministers 
- With Council working groups or COREPER 
- With the European Parliament 
 
7 
3 
4 
0 
1 
1 
 
12 
6 
5 
2 
2 
2 
Departmental contacts: 
- With colleagues within “own” agency unit 
- With colleagues in other units within “own” agency 
- with the Executive Director of “own” agency 
- With the Director or programme manager of their 
“own” unit/programme 
 
89 
56 
9 
 
40 
 
86 
70 
20 
 
80 
Epistemic contacts:  
- With individuals inside their “own” agency whom 
they respect for their expertise 
- With individuals outside their “own” agency whom 
they respect for their expertise 
- With industry 
- With non-governmental organisations 
- With universities and research institutes 
 
 
57 
 
23 
13 
26 
7 
 
 
60 
 
42 
10 
15 
20 
Mean N 100 
(163) 
100 
(93) 
  *) Original question: “How frequently do you have contacts and meetings with the following during a typical 
week?” 
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1) The variables listed include officials having contacts fairly often, or very often with the respective institutions. 
This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: very often (value 1), fairly often (value 2), both/and 
(value 3), fairly seldom (value 4), and very seldom (value 5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4: PERCENT OF AGENCY PERSONNEL WHO EMPHASISE PROPOSALS, 
STATEMENTS AND ARGUMENTS FROM THE FOLLOWING INSTITUTIONS 
(PERCENT).
*, 1)
 
 Regulatory 
agencies 
Non-regulatory 
agencies 
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Supranational considerations: 
- From their “own” Commission DG 
- From other Commission DGs 
- From the Council of Ministers 
- From Council working groups or COREPER 
- From the European Parliament 
 
31 
23 
20 
15 
21 
 
56 
54 
31 
25 
42 
Departmental considerations: 
- From colleagues within their “own” unit 
- From colleagues in other units within their “own” 
agency 
- From the Management board of their “own” agency 
- From the Executive Director of their “own” agency 
- From the Director or programme manager of their 
“own” unit/programme 
 
95 
 
77 
60 
65 
 
81 
 
93 
 
92 
88 
96 
 
93 
Epistemic considerations:  
-From individuals inside their “own” agency whom 
they respect for their expertise 
- From individuals outside their “own” agency whom 
they respect for their expertise 
- From industry 
- From non-governmental organisations 
- From universities or research institutions 
 
 
84 
 
59 
39 
23 
17 
 
 
89 
 
68 
34 
36 
48 
Mean N 100 
(160) 
100 
(88) 
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*) Original question: “How much consideration do you give to proposals, statements and arguments from the 
following?” 
1) The variables listed include officials emphasising proposals, statements and arguments from the respective 
institutions fairly much, or very much. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: very much 
(value 1), fairly much (value 2), both/and (value 3), fairly little (value 4), and very little (value 5).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 5: PERCENT OF AGENCY PERSONNEL WHO STRONGLY AGREE ON 
THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS (PERCENT).
*, 1)
  
 Regulatory 
agencies 
Non-regulatory 
agencies 
Supranational statements: 
- “I put forward proposals I think is to the benefit for 
the EU member-states as a group” 
- “I put forward proposals I think is to the benefit for 
the European Union” 
 
 
45 
 
57 
 
 
55 
 
67 
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Departmental statements: 
-“My work is normally co-ordinated with all relevant 
units within my agency” 
- “My work is normally co-ordinated within my own 
unit” 
- “My work is normally co-ordinated with the 
leadership of my Agency” 
- “I put forward proposals I think is to the benefit of 
my Agency” 
- “My work is strongly guided by formal rules and 
regulations within my Agency” 
 
 
36 
 
75 
 
35 
 
69 
 
60 
 
 
44 
 
72 
 
54 
 
77 
 
54 
Epistemic statements:  
-“I put forward proposals on the basis of my 
professional expertise” 
- “I have a considerable amount of behavioural 
discretion at my disposal” 
 
 
86 
 
39 
 
 
89 
 
42 
Mean N 100 
(167) 
100 
(89) 
*) Original question: “Please consider the following statements”. 
1) The variables listed included officials who strongly agree on the statements mentioned. The original 
variable consisted of the following three-point scale: strongly agree (value 1), both/and (value 2), and 
strongly disagree (value 3). 
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TABLE 6: PERCENT OF AGENCY PERSONNEL WHO FEEL AN ALLEGIANCE 
TOWARDS THE FOLLOWING (PERCENT).
*, 1)
 
 Regulatory 
agencies 
Non-regulatory 
agencies 
Supranational allegiances: 
- The European Union as a whole 
- The European Commission 
 
51 
49 
 
67 
67 
Departmental allegiances: 
- Their “own” agency as a whole 
- The unit in which they are working 
 
80 
90 
 
89 
94 
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Epistemic allegiances:  
- Their “own” professional (educational) 
background and expertise 
- The policy area in which they are working 
- Industry 
- Non-governmental organisations 
- Towards Universities or research institutions 
 
 
83 
71 
25 
24 
13 
 
 
87 
72 
18 
20 
25 
Mean N 100 
(166) 
100 
(89) 
*) Original question: “Whom of the following do you feel an allegiance to (identify or feel responsible to)?” 
1) The variables listed included officials who feel very strongly or fairly strongly allegiances. The original 
variable consisted of the following five-point scale: very strongly (value 1), fairly strongly (value 2), 
both/and (value 3), fairly weakly (value 4), very weakly (value 5). 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 7: PERCENT OF AGENCY PERSONNEL WHO THINK OF OTHER 
AGENCY OFFICIALS ACT MAINLY AS “EU REPRESENTATIVES”, “AGENCY 
REPRESENTATIVES”, “UNIT REPRESENTATIVES” AND/OR “INDEPENDENT 
EXPERTS” (PERCENT).
*, 1)
 
 Regulatory agencies Non-regulatory agencies 
A supranational dynamic: 
- “EU representatives” 
 
39 
 
51 
A departmental dynamic: 
- “Agency representatives” 
- “Unit representatives” 
 
54 
46 
 
57 
44 
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An epistemic dynamic:  
- “Independent experts” 
 
59 
 
46 
Mean N 100 
(169) 
100 
(92) 
*) Original question: “Generally speaking, to what extent do you think colleagues within your Agency act like 
EU representatives, agency representatives, unit representatives and/or independent experts?”. 
1) The variables listed included officials who strongly agree on the statements mentioned. The original 
variable consisted of the following three-point scale: strongly agree (value 1), both/and (value 2), and 
strongly disagree (value 3). 
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